Relighting the Torch

So this post is thanks to Timehop.  Four years ago today I wrote about Frank Buckles, the last American WWI veteran.  My last post was in November 2011.  My life got really busy and my blog got pushed to the back burner.  Now, I'm a history teacher and want to write again.  So I'm hopefully going to be posting again!  Enjoy reading!

Victory for Lee at Gettysburg?

So my wife and I went to Gettysburg over the summer and had a great time.  Got a great hat...yeah my Mosby hat (actually an Appomattox hat, I got it wrong, BUT I'm calling it my Mosby hat); shoutout to a great retailer Dirty Billy's Hats.  That is an AWESOME hat, great store, and great staff, but I digress...

I came home and found at VCU library (my wife is a grad student there and she checks out books for me) "The Gettysburg Companion" by Mark Adkin.  Now at first glance, it is a solid work.  But after reading through it, I did find a few inaccuracies, followed by a review on Amazon about Adkin not citing works and maps used.  That aside, I will say that the maps are wonderful and he is very thorough.  He also writes about critiques and concepts in the battle.  While the book is not the most scholarly, it does pose some interesting questions and it made me ponder, could Lee truly have won at Gettysburg?  My answer is surprisingly yes.  (Keep in mind though that I do have the advantage of hindsight).  There are several things he could have done differently.

First, "discretionary" orders.  Lee should have been more specific in a situation like this.  Instead of communicating to his commanders (ex. Stuart, Longstreet, Ewell) orders giving them latitude, he should have written out specific orders detailing what Lee wanted done.  This also brings up councils of war.  Often times before major campaigns, Lee would meet with his subordinates to describe the pieces of the puzzle and how troops would be working in concert.  There is no evidence that Lee met with his four top subordinates (Longstreet, Ewell, Hill and Stuart) together at one time during the campaign, so that immediately put the Confederates at an extreme disadvantage.  First, with Lee giving Stuart latitude, Stuart went on a ride where he disregarded Lee instructions to ultimately end up screening the right flank of the advance (namely covering the gaps in South Mountain to the east of Ewell's Second Corps).  Instead, Stuart takes his three best brigades on a ride around the Army of the Potomac and ended up being cut off and the senior brigade commander (Beverly Robertson) was incompetent.  But even then, Lee still should have kept track of the cavalry left behind and did not.  As a commander, Lee failed to keep track of all his available units, despite Stuart's disappearance.  Robertson's two brigades could have been used to good effect if Lee had stayed on top of their positions.  They could have screened the army coming over Cashtown Pass.

Another failure of command was simply not bringing the army back together sooner.  It wasn't until the afternoon of the 29th that Lee ordered the army back rendezvous in the Gettysburg/Cashtown area.  While Lee was trying to threaten Harrisburg and Wrightsville across the Susquehanna, he should have reasoned the Federals were close behind his army after being tardy to the party.  Even then, he could have used the area around Gettysburg to his advantage.  I thought the ANV was still coming up from the south on July 1st and the First Corps under Longstreet was south of Chambersburg and was nowhere near being able to support Hill's advance into Gettysburg.  Quite the contrary; Longstreet's ENTIRE First Corps were encamped around Chambersburg from June 27-30.  That is three days!  On July 1st, out of Lee's nine infantry divisions, only two were east of the South Mountain:  Rodes and Early.  The remaining seven were stacked up along the Chambersburg Pike and bottlenecked at Cashtown Pass.  I don't know how many of you have actually travelled along the pass, but it is a narrow defile even today that is easily over ten miles!  If Lee were smart, he would have scouted out nearby passes to see where he could have moved the army over in a hurry if needed.  One of the closest passes only about 20 miles to the south was Monterey Gap (Pass).  What made this option even more attractive was its link to Fairfield, PA and the Fairfield Road.  If Lee had moved the entire First Corps south to cross over South Mountain at Monterey Gap, it would have been disastrous for Meade at Gettysburg.  Imagine on July 1st, Heth is headed into Gettysburg with the remaining divisions of the Third Corps (Pender and Anderson) behind him.  Moving down from the north a few miles away is Ewell's pair of divisions of Rodes and Early.  But instead of being stacked up behind Cashtown Pass, moving up from the southwest is Hood and McLaws.  What would have eventually confronted them was I Corps and XI Corps along with Buford's cavalry.  Six Confederate divisions against only two Union corps?  Yeah, definitely could have done some serious damage to Meade's army...at the least, could have evened the odds with Meade.  Of course, more than likely Meade would have withdrawn to Pipe Creek, but still, the question remains, what could have happened if Lee took a little more after Napoleon in marching his troops on a broad front.  Napoleon was known for "marching divided, fighting united."  He would have his entire corps de armee along sometimes up to a 200 mile front in order to supply them and have them not hinder anyone else's movements.  Often times what would happen was if the vanguard made contact with the enemy, it would hold the enemy in place.  The supporting and reserve corps were often within only a half day's march of the point of contact and thus give Napoleon great tactical and strategic options.


If Lee tried this at Gettysburg, the most vulnerable corps would have been Longstreet's, being that his First Corps was closest to the Army of the Potomac, presumably south of the MD/PA state line.  Worst case scenario, Longstreet would dig in along the Monterey Gap/Fairfield Pass and lock Meade's army into place, while marching down from the north would have been Hill's corps coming over the Cashtown Pass and supporting his left would have been Ewell's pair of divisions marching in from Heidlersburg.  If Meade had advanced as far north as Gettysburg (which he was near that position on July 1st), Hill would have occupied the middle of Lee's position with Ewell advancing from the north, and Longstreet would be in position to catch any Union troops marching hard to reinforce Meade's corps at Gettysburg or threaten the Gettysburg position from a new axis of advance.  If Meade did figure out what Lee was up to, Meade would have fallen back to Pipe Creek.  Lee would pursued along a three pronged axis (Longstreet to the west from Fairfield to Emmitsburg to Taneytown, Hill in the middle from Cashtown to Gettysburg to Littlestown and Ewell to the east from Heidelsburg to Gettysburg to Hanover to Union Mills area).  Meade would have been in a bad spot having sent I Corps with XI Corps in support to Gettysburg with III Corps at Emmitsburg.  All three would have been isolated with Lee moving in from the east and north against I & XI Corps and northeast against III Corps.  If even one of these formations had been mauled, it would have made Meade's plan to defend at Pipe Creek that much more difficult.

Granted Meade would have had some great advantages of his own.  His QM and Supply Corps would have set up a base at Westminster, the end of the Western Maryland Railroad.  Historically, it was the Army of the Potomac's base, but the Pipe Creek line would have ensured a closer resupply, versus Lee who had little supply coming over the mountains.  From what I have heard, it was an extremely strong position, thus negating the loss of any troops lost (I, III or XI Corps).  Additionally, he had just about his entire army in place, while Lee would have only had two thirds of his infantry divisions moving along his advance, but the remaining divisions would have been in close support.  Meade would have dug in and it would have been a Fredericksburg in reverse.

I hope this has been an interesting speculation on Gettysburg. 

R.I.P. Colonel Cyrus "Rick" Rescorla

I was re-reading "We Were Soldiers" a while back (for a recent blog post), and came across a certain individual involved in the Ia Drang battles.  One of the officers in charge of some of the troops was 1st Lt. Cyrus "Rick" Rescorla.  He was an interesting individual who definitely made his mark on American military and civil history.

Rescorla was born in England in 1939 and by 1943 was surrounded by US GI's and this made a great impression on the young Brit.  So in 1957 he enlisted in the British Army and served with the paratroopers, a great asset to his future military endeavors.  He served with the paratroopers in Cyprus before leaving the military to join the Metropolitan Police force in London.  He served there until 1963 when he moved to a YMCA in Brooklyn in preparation to join the US Army in 1963.  Rescorla underwent basic, OCS and airborne school before being assigned as a 1st Lt. as a platoon leader in the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division (Air mobile). 

Deployed to Vietnam, Rescorla's company wasn't a part of Hal Moore's battalion, but was attached later and he displayed personal bravery in face of tremendous odds at Ia Drang's X-Ray fight.  He was nicknamed "Hard Core" for his excellent combat leadership and also caught the eye of Hal Moore who called Rescorla "the best platoon leader I ever saw."  One piece of note from the movie "We Were Soldiers" that was attributed to someone else, but Rescorla was the one who actually did this.  After the final big attack, actor Ryan Hurst (Sgt. Ernie Savage) picked up a brashttp://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=3355211812998328476&postID=9218765582902801025s bugle.  This one was a French Army bugle from around the turn of the century.  In fact, it was Rescorla who recovered this instrument while policing the battlefield after the fight.  His company commander asked him to hang onto the bugle and play it at the battalion's reunions in the future, which Rescorla gladly did.

After leaving the US Army in the early 1970s, Rescorla attended University of Oklahoma where he got his bachelors and masters' degrees.  He worked in academia for a bit before moving to the financial sector.  After a big savings and loan scandal, he moved to New York and took a position with Dean Witter Reynolds.  In 1997 when Dean Witter Reynolds merged to form Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, he was offered the post as director of security.

Unfortunately, his security duties with Dean Witter Reynolds also brought him into the limelight.  In 1992, Rescorla believed that his DWR's offices in the World Trade Center were vulnerable by a truck bomb that could be detonated in the parking decks under the towers.  His theory was indeed proved correct by the first attempt on the WTC in 1993.  In that attack, Rescorla was the last man out, ensuring everyone else made it out ahead of them.

Rescorla reasoned that the threat to the building was not over and believed that it would be a plane flying into the building.  He convinced his bosses that they had to move to New Jersey in a four story building to be safer, but the lease in the WTC would not be over until 2006.  In the interim, Rescorla instituted manditory evacuations to be practiced every three months.

On September 11, 2001 at 8:46 am when the planes struck the WTC, Rescorla activated the evacuation plans and got 3,700 MSDW employees out of the burning building, ignoring the official's advice to stay put.  When Rescorla got his people out, he went back in and last was seen on the 10th floor headed up, trying to ensure others who worked on the floors above them.  It was rumored he made it as high as the 72nd floor before at 9:59 when WTC 2 came crashing down.  While the loss of life was great in WTC 2, the fact that among the 3,700 Morgan Stanley employees, only six were killed on 9/11:  four of them were Rescorla and three of his deputies.  This is a testimony to a great American, yes, while born in Britain he is indeed an American, both in combat and on America's toughest day.


To conclude this post, it is scheduled to post at 9:59 am on 9/11/11, ten years to the minute when WTC 2 (the south tower) collapsed, presumably taking "Hardcore" Rescorla with it.  Over 3,700 people owe him their lives.

The Day...The Dreadnought...Died..."

“The Day…the Dreadnought…Died…”

This blog was inspired by another great read I discovered.  No relation to Don McLean is intended, licensed or implied.  No restrictions apply, see store for details…

Now that I’ve got the legal mumbo jumbo out of the way, today is about Battleships, and in particular that date which the battleship truly became obsolete.  Most probably non-historian Americans would probably point to December 7, 1941 when the Japanese bombed and torpedoed the big gun line at Pearl Harbor.  But you would be wrong for a few reasons.

First, these battleships, while impressive, were 25+ years old at the time of Pearl Harbor.  The newest dreadnought was the West Virginia and she was commissioned in 1923!  The ole lady of the fleet, Nevada was in service during the First World War.  These ships were not the newest and best.  As a result, they did not have the best AAA (anti-aircraft artillery) available at the time.  The 5”/25cal was an extremely light round that barely had enough killing power at is was.  Next was the 1.1” machine gun mounts that were good, but were extremely prone to overheating…not good in battle.  Finally, the lowly “Ma-deuce” .50 Browning Ultra Heavy Machine Gun for close in.  Solid gun, but not built for the newest in high speed aircraft of the early 1940s.  Additionally, armor and subdivision had improved greatly since their construction.  I mean, in the early 1920s, the US was still using bi-planes.  The planes were slow, carried little heavy ordnance and were used for reconnaissance rather than actual combat.  The battleships did not even have any anti-aircraft directors, unlike in 1941 when they were prepared to fight against aircraft.

Secondly, and just as important, these ships were at anchor.  The helm, while depending on the navy, was used to varying degrees of importance (Japan, extreme maneuvers v. the US where it was highly discouraged), the helm still played a role in avoiding enemy ordnance.  Even as late as 1942, it was possible for a ship to evade torpedoes from aircraft by showing them their “back side” (smallest profile possible).  Dive bombers were harder to shove off, but it was possible to at least dodge the first few bombs with hard maneuvering.

So when did the dreadnought cease to be the king of the sea if not on December 7^th?  Well, actually, it was only a few days after Pearl Harbor on December 10^th with the sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales (hence to be referred to as PoW).  Even then, that sinkings were a stroke of pure luck and the actual date could have been much later, but we shall see.  Thus enter “Battleship:  The Loss of the Prince of Wales and Repulse” by Martin Middleburg and Patrick Mahoney.  The book was published in 1977 with a mixture of official records and survivor accounts from both sides sprinkled in.  I will say that from a historian’s eye, it does have a few inaccuracies, but these can be ignored due to change in information from then until now.

To recap, the two ships were sent to “deter” Japanese aggression towards the British Far East Fleet’s base at Singapore.  HMS Repulse was a battlecruiser, meaning she was fast and heavily armed, but armor was not quite up to the par of the 1940s. Battlecruisers were supposed to rely more on their speed than armor to shrug off any hits. On top of that, the ship was in desperate need of upgrading, but there was no time for that.  She was built during WWI and was not equipped with the latest AAA or nor the most up to date defense measures (anti-torpedo blisters).  So Churchill and the Admiralty believed that she was an older, but powerful unit that could be used as a deterrent.

The PoW on the other hand was completely different.  Launched in 1939 and commissioned earlier in 1941, Prince of Wales was supposed to be the epitome of British battleship design.  Unfortunately, the London Naval Treaty hampered King George V’s design, the class that PoW belonged to:  35,000 ton weight limit, 14” gun diameter.  Additionally, the British focused on operating close to home (British Isles), so their range was not up to par of the other battleships designed by the major powers. Protection was adequate.  Finally, there was one more drawback to the KGV class:  in order to make up for the smaller big guns, designers gave the class ten 14” guns.  That meant two turrets of four guns each.  None of the major powers attempted to create a quad gun turret.  The weight, gearing and engines used to turn the turrets caused the turrets to jam and fail as did with other units of the class.  But it was the best Britain had.

In the Admiralty’s defense, they planned to add a fleet carrier to the mix to make it a fairly solid Force (they were trying for an action group like in their pursuit of Bismarck earlier in the year).  Unfortunately HMS Indomitable was working up her air group in the relative safety of the Caribbean and while training she struck an uncharted reef.  This deprived Force Z of vital on scene air cover, but it was not to be.

One more thing must be examined when it comes to the loss of PoW and Repulse:  the commanding officer on scene.  Admiral Sir Thomas “Tom” Phillips was a veteran of WWI and had seen some action then.  After rising through the ranks and commanding various ships, by 1941 Phillips was the equivalent of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations with the Admiralty.  Though he hadn’t been to sea since 1939, he was a close friend of the 1^st Sea Lord, Winston Churchill.  So Churchill didn’t have to reach far to put a confidant in charge of the operation.  Phillips was indeed an “old school” officer.  His beliefs about the destruction of ships by air forces were the result of poor handling by ships’ captain and crew rather than the effectiveness of the air attack.  While we have the advantage of hindsight, the aircraft in late 1941 had yet to actually sink a capital ship out on the open water.  Middlebrook and Mahoney actually cite the examples in their book of capital ships sunk in European waters (by capital ship, they also include aircraft carriers).  Page 17 – 18 is where it is listed:

17 September 1939 – HMS Courageous (carrier) was torpedoed by U29.

14 October 1939 – HMS Royal Oak (battleship) was torpedoed in Scapa Flow by U47.

17 December 1939 – Graf Spee (armored ship) scuttled after an engagement off the River Platte with cruisers HMS Exeter, Ajax and Achillies.

8 June 1940 – HMS Glorious (carrier) sunk by gunfire by German battlecruisers Gneisenau and Scharnhorst.

3 July 1940 – French Bretagne (battleship) destroyed by Royal Navy fire in Oran.

12 November 1940 – Italian battleships Littorio, Conte Di Cavour, Caio Duilo torpedoed and sank at moorings in Taranto harbor by air attack from HMS Illustrious.

24 May 1941 – HMS Hood (battlecruiser) sunk by gunfire from German battleship Bismarck.

27 May 1941 – Bismarck scuttled after being crippled by Fleet Air Arm aircraft, but demolished by HMS King George V and Rodney (battleships) in gunnery action.

13 November 1941 – HMS Ark Royal (carrier) torpedoed by U81 off Gibraltar.

25 November 1941 – HMS Barham (battleship) torpedoed by U331 in the Mediterranean and magazines exploded.

So while it is difficult for us to understand why these two ships would have ever dreamed about sailing without air cover, I think from what Phillips knew, he figured he was OK since only one time did aircraft sink any capital ships and that was while they were in port.  Looking at it from that perspective, it seems that Phillips’ attitude of “anything flying over my capital ships will be blown out of the sky” (or something to that effect.  I’ve tried hard to find the exact quote from the book, but I can’t.) is quite justified.  Even then, he expected his big ship to be well protected from the one major threat to his ships:  torpedoes.

Phillips believed two things.  One that his modern PoW was able to shrug off torpedo hits and he was right…to some degree.  While no ship is truly unsinkable, PoW was solidly subdivided to be able to contain damage from flooding caused by a torpedo.  Second, he believed (incorrectly) that the Japanese had no aircraft, land or carrier based that COULD sink his battleship.  He and all the Admiralty were indeed duped by Japan looking at now obsolete aircraft diving on targets in China and there was little intelligence to suggest that Japan had otherwise.  From an intelligence and strategic standpoint, Japan had the Western world fooled into what their armed forces were equipped with and capable of projecting.

Probably the closest example Phillips should have looked at was his own side’s attack on Taranto against the Italian fleet as to what aircraft could do.  Fleet Air Arm’s own (truly) obsolescence aircraft the biplane Swordfish knocked out three Italian battleships at anchor.  So this should have shown Phillips the potential of aircraft, but again, discounted it since the ships were at anchor, age of the ships and the Italian design system.  Anchored ships have already been covered, so instead I’ll focus on the other two.  Two of the Italian ships were WWI vintage, although they were extensively rebuilt between the wars (although the other one was of a modern design, Littorio of the Vittorio Venito class), but that leads me to the third facet.  The Pugliese system was the primary Italian torpedo defense systems for their big battleships.  From http://www.navweps.com/ here’s the description of the system:

“The Pugliese design filled the volume of the TDS with a large cylinder, which was in turn filled with closed tubes reminiscent of those in HMS Ramillies.  Pugiese’s theory was that the torpedo would expend its energy crushing the cylinder.  In practice the design failed miserably.  Following the path of least resistance, the blast traveled around the cylinder and concentrated itself against the weakest point of the complex structure supporting the cylinder:  the concave holding bulkhead.”

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-047.htm

So Phillips felt completely justified in sallying forth when word reached him that a Japanese invasion convoy was approaching the Malayan coastline.  He felt that if the Navy could do something to stop the invasion, he should.  So he sortied the PoW and Repulse along with four destroyers to smash the transports.  Had he waited though, he would have added HMS Exeter, a heavy cruiser would arrive from across the Indian Ocean within three days, and possibly HMS Mauritius, a modern light cruiser of Fiji design while undergoing engine repairs could have been ready to sail within 48 hours.  That would have made a nasty threat to the Japanese, but alas, Phillips wanted to sail as soon as possible.

The Japanese set up minefields before war was declared and deployed submarines to block the believed route.  However, Phillips maneuvered far to the east of the line, but the Japanese got lucky that the ships passed within sight of their eastern most submarine.  For what would become a huge snafu for the Japanese, they mishandled the news for the first time and the vital information was received much too late to be of use.  The force screening the Japanese troop convoy was much too small to truly defend the convoy, but due to an unexpected Japanese aerial flare being dropped it spooked both forces away from each other.  Phillips was about to turn home empty handed, but within an hour, a new report was sent to him about a Japanese landing and decided to investigate.  Once again, the force was sighted by a Japanese submarine and again passed the information on and again was delayed getting to the powers that be.  The opportunity almost passed the Japanese by again by not equipping their strike force with enough torpedo bombers, but they managed to catch some breaks.

Two types of Japanese aircraft attacked British Force Z:  The “Nell” and “Betty” bombers.  Both were medium bombers that could be equipped with bombs or torpedoes.  They also had a further range than contemporary British aircraft, so Phillips believed he was out of aerial danger (despite a Japanese aerial attack on Singapore the first day of the war).  Unfortunately, when his force was spotted, Japanese aircraft turned to converge on his position.  Even then, his force’s days were not numbered.

That occurred when PoW was attacked by several Japanese aircraft.  Phillips believed his flagship only sustained one torpedo hit, but in fact sustained two.  The first one struck the ship amidships on the port side and was absorbed by the torpedo defense system.  The second one, however, was much more serious.  Again hitting on the port side, this torpedo struck just ahead of the number four shaft.  This hit essentially flooded the entire propeller shaft all the way back to the engines, boilers, and dynamo (generator) rooms and flooded them.  This one disabled took out the ship’s electrical power, disabling everything:

• ·         Pumps – According to Middlebrook and Mahoney, the PoW was equipped with fourteen 350 tons/hr. pumps and four 1,000 tons/hr. emergency bilge pumps.  Unfortunately, the rear ones were without power due to dynamo flooding and the failure of the electrical system.
• ·         Counter flooding – When a ship sustains damage to the hull, one of the most common defense mechanisms is counterflooding.  An equal amount of water can be pumped into the hull to offset the list or degree off the horizon the ship is.  Again, won’t work if there is no power.  This also affected the ships AAA armament:  they need a platform within 10 degrees of the horizon to work (plus they will be covered a bit later).
• ·         Communication – With the power out, phone systems were down.  Messages had to be passed by hand and accurate assessments could not be done.  For instance, one electrical repair party was attempting to provide power to the 5.25” turrets by emergency wires when the system to redistribute power from the front half of the ship to the rear went unchecked.
• ·         Ventilation & Lighting – Even the warm air on the main decks were cooler than the engine spaces of PoW.  As a result of no power, air stopped moving and men began to overhead down in the few working boiler, engine and dynamo spaces.  This made it very difficult to get the damage under control as well.
• ·         Steering – Prince of Wales’ steering motors were cut off from power, thus making the ship near impossible to maneuver when the next inevitable attack came.
• ·         Anti-aircraft armament – As stated earlier, PoW’s 5.25” guns needed less than 10’ list on the deck to function properly…and then they needed power to work.  The aft ones were completely without power and thus were useless, and the four forward guns were out of action due to the list of the ship.

 (All these were summarized from Middleburg and Mahoney’s book)

So Prince of Wales was out of action, though not sinking, not maneuvering, not doing a whole lot of anything.  The Japanese aircraft were heading out of the area headed for Saigon.  Phillips had no way of knowing there were many more aircraft headed towards Force Z’s location.  The lull brought a 20 minute respite, but more aircraft droned in overhead.  This time, with a crippled PoW and an ill protected Repulse stood on the verge of being slaughtered.  Japanese torpedo bombers quickly struck their torpedoes home on the stern again and caused PoW to slowly begin settling by the stern.  Repulse, under the helm of Captain Tennant, continued to evade torpedoes.  She managed to shake off one torpedo hit before taking an attack from a force of nine Japanese aircraft originally intending to attack PoW, but not really needed since the ship was settling.  This squadron launched a coordinated attack on port and starboard simultaneously so that Captain Tennant could not avoid them all.  Three more torpedoes hit port side and the ship shuddered to a halt before the ship’s list increased before turning turtle and sinking.  Prince of Wales lasted longer, but ultimately, both ships sank to the bottom of the South China Sea.

I think a little creative thinking is necessary at this juncture.  Could PoW and Repulse have survived?  Quite possibly.  As shown by Bismarck, no matter how modern, a ship is still vulnerable at the stern.  The torpedo hit was indeed a fluke and did hit beyond the battleship’s citadel (the armored part in the center, protecting the the boilers, engines and dynamos).  But what it did was flood back and bypasses the armor protection of the ship.  I believe any battleship (even Wisconsin or the mighty Yamato) struck in the place would have serious problems.  As much as people say that oil is the lifeblood of a battleship, it is the boilers that generate steam for boilers and generators.  Even then, electricity is what powers everything on a ship.  When that goes out, everything is lost until that can be fixed.  Had the torpedo struck somewhere else (as demonstrated by the second hit on PoW), it may not have seriously affected PoW.  Even keeping PoW around after 10 December may have seriously hampered Japanese efforts to taking the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia).  I mean, imagine what would have happened with the ABDA force at the Battle of Java Sea?  This would have certainly affected Japanese strategy in their operation to take Java and forced them to reinforce their attack force with modern battleships or perhaps even the Kido Butai (First Air Fleet).

Even if PoW and Repulse survived their sortie, when would the battleship’s reign have ended?  Again, this is an area of conjecture and speculation, but it may have taken a much longer time, although again the US Navy would have probably gone with carriers as their lead capital ships only out of necessity.

"The Gallant Hours"

I've got another WWII movie I watched recently that I literally stumbled on.  It is from 1960 called "The Gallant Hours" staring James Cagney.  It is about Flt. Adm. William Halsey.  As much as it is called for to use Halsey's nickname "Bull" for this review, I will refrain since I heard Halsey said he hated that name.

"The Gallant Hours" is about Halsey assuming command in SOUWESPAC and his conduct during the battle of Guadalcanal from 8 October - 1 December 1942.  It is quite a narrative, though inaccurate at times.  Cagney also plays a much more subdued Halsey.  For instance, at the beginning of the film, Cagney gets notice he will take command and simply passes the message to his staff.  In reality, Halsey was heard to have said the famous quote "Jesus Christ and General Jackson!  This is the hottest potato they ever handed me."  Additionally, near the end of the film, Cagney orchestrates the "assassination" of Japanese Admiral Irosoku Yamamoto, when the actual event took place nearly six months after the movie was set (April 1943).  It also has a few dryer moments, such as Cagney playing out the famous November 11, 1942 Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in his head that could have been done without, but hey, I didn't make the film.

The movie, however, does have its good points. There is no actual combat on screen.  It is more a story of Halsey's command from a rear area, and the strategic planning Halsey and his staff undertook to make a successful Guadalcanal campaign.  Cagney knew when to act boldly and when to hold his hand.  I think it also shows the singularity of command:  everyone could give advice, but only Halsey could make the final call.  It is a lonely place to be in command, especially the higher level of command.  Even Cagney said of Halsey's famous "Attack!  Repeat!  Attack!" order:  "It is easy to order an attack, especially when you aren't the one doing the attacking."  Indeed, that is never more true in warfare.  It also showed Halsey surrounded by his staff and having the right people for the job.  Additionally, Halsey also trusted the people with their boots on the ground.  In my mind, this is more like Halsey's WWII counterpart, Adm. Raymond Spruance, whom I admire, but I'm sure Halsey had his moments as well.

For all its inaccuracies, I still highly recommend this film.  Personally, I'd love to see a new Midway movie and also a film about the life of Spruance.  That would be phenomenal.

Memorial Day Origins

Note:  This was written on my wife's PC around Memorial Day and of course it is now posted much later.  I still hope you all enjoy.

 

On this Memorial Day weekend, I feel led to share a story of local lore that I hope you all will enjoy.  During the American Civil War, one of the multitudes of actions taking place occurred on June 9^th, 1864 just south of Petersburg, VA.  While most of the regular Confederate troops in Petersburg were facing east against advancing Union infantry, a column of Union cavalry approached Petersburg from the south along the Jerusalem Plank Road (modern US 301 or Crater Road).  The only troops available to stop this advance were literally personally armed citizens.  Only around 200 citizens were poised to stop or stall over 1,300 Union cavalry.  These citizens had the advantage of strong field fortifications as well as a single obsolete artillery piece while the Union cavalry had none.  These 200 citizens sustained losses, but gained valuable time to allow Confederate cavalry to drive the Union cavalry out of Petersburg.  This battle gained the title of “The Battle of Old Men and Young Boys” since they were the ones who fought the fight.

During the next few weeks while the armies pulled back from fighting, the local populace lionized their fallen citizens at nearby Blandford Cemetery.  Several funerals were held at the local churches with the burials taking place at the cemetery.  Less than ten days later, the troops returned and put Petersburg under the crosshairs of war for the next nine months.

When the armies left, they left behind their dead.  While the Union army had the Quartermaster Corps to remove the dead and established Military Cemeteries, the Confederates had no system to inter their dead.  So the ladies of Petersburg set out to collect all the remains of the fallen southern soldiers.  They kicked off their efforts on June 9^th, 1866, one year after the Battle of Old Men and Young Boys.  One of the men who attended the ceremony was Maj. Gen. John A. Logan, a Union general.  He observed the ceremony, called Remembrance Day and decided that the Union veterans deserved a ceremony of their own.  Logan was also in charge of the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.) and the largest veterans group in the U.S.  He lobbied and got the Memorial Day holiday observed on the last Monday in May.

By the way, the ladies got the funding going in 1870 or so to reinter the Confederate dead.  They believed that they would find 5,000 remains and the project would take a year.  25,000 remains and fifteen years later, the process was completed.  So the next phase was to restore Blandford Church as a monument to the Confederate dead.  They did so with the help of Louis Comfort Tiffany’s famous glass manufacturing company to create stained glass for all the windows of the church.  Every state that provided Confederate troops to the war effort was invited to sponsor a window.  The only one that did not was Kentucky, only because they were focusing on more local monuments.  The church stands to this day as only one of four buildings with all Tiffany stained glass windows in them.  This lovely church has personal significance to me because it was where my lovely bride and I were wed.  We couldn’t find a more beautiful or historic location to have our wedding.

A Stonewall Jackson "What if"

I’m sorry for lack of posts recently, but when the Internet connection at home doesn’t work and now you have to transpose to the library’s computer, fun times indeed.  At an hour at a time, I don’t want to be constrained by time.

This blog has been on my mind since early May and I’ve been pondering it for a while.  Back in early May (the 10^th I believe), someone asked on Facebook the question whether Jackson’s death would have changed the Civil War.  The answer choices was yes; no, but it certainly didn’t help; and no.  Most of the answers were yes or no with the caveat.  At the time I posted, I was the only person who said no.  This got me thinking of all points of view on this.

There were a few other folks who posted on both, so I do have a place to start.  The yes folks went with the standard “Gettysburg” answer, and this does deserve a little respect and insight.  If Jackson were alive, it is indeed possible.  Lee would not have reorganized his army and with Jackson in command, things may or may not have been different at Gettysburg.  There is precedence that Jackson may have engaged the Federals on the first day of Gettysburg (assuming events continued as followed).  Heck, there may not have even been a battle at Gettysburg if Jackson were alive.  But assuming the events continued and it was Jackson in command the first day instead of Hill and Ewell, I do believe it would have made a difference.  Jackson would not have allowed his corps to be spread out (ex. 2^nd Manassas) and probably could have overwhelmed Buford’s and Reynolds’ troops.  He could have also taken Cemetery Hill, unlike Ewell, mainly due to his inspirational leadership and his understanding of Lee’s “suggestive” orders.  Even more believe that Jackson would have prevented Pickett’s Charge.  While this is a bit thin, again, this all depends on events occurring as we know them.  Jackson may have “advised” Lee to not invade the North, but simply threaten Washington as he did the previous summer after Manassas.    

Why I ended up saying No is very simple.  I think Lee wrecked his army in 1862 by his desperate campaign around Richmond in the Seven Days Battles.  The situation was only made worse by the remaining 1862 campaigns and 1863.  Looking at casualties, Lee’s army sustained 20,000+ casualties during the Seven Days, 10,000+ for the 2^nd Manassas Campaign, 12,000+ for Antietam Campaign, 5,000+ for Fredericksburg and 12,000+ for Chancellorsville.  Those are some massive casualty rates.  What makes it worse is the casualty rates among officers.  Lee could ill afford to many casualties and you have to examine how many of these battles were offensive in nature for the Confederates:

Seven Days Battles (necessity in order to save Richmond, but truly excessive casualties)

2nd Manassas Campaign (again, offensive in nature, but still could have been avoided by defensive fight)

Antietam (not offensive in tactical nature, but strategic offensive)

Chancellorsville (truly aggresive and losses showed it)

Lee had one mission during the Civil War and it was the same as his ancestor (by marriage) from the Revolution...not lose.  He didn't have to score the knockout blow, he didn't have to conquer the North, he just had to outlast the Northern populace (like the colonies did to England).  But what made this notion change during the 80 odd years?  One man...Napoleon Bonaparte.  Napoleon scored decisive victories time and time again, but it ended up costing him, such as Lee.  The Grande Armee of 1805 was not the same force by 1812 or even 1809 because of Napoleon's excessively aggressive tactics.  Napoleon conscripted "allies" in order to sustain his army for so long; Lee could not.  What Lee had in terms of population was it.  Additionally, and to me this is most important, Napoleon still lost.  It may have taken the Allied coalitions nearly twenty years, but ultimately they triumphed and forced Napoleon into exile.  Didn't Lee think about this as he studied Napoleon's command and battles?

If you want further proof, take a look at my attached link.  Great empirical study of Lee and Grant's command styles.