I'd like to apologize for the lack of posts lately. I didn't think it was that long, but I will also confess I've had a bit of History burnout lately. I've also been binging on history movies in watching some good history movies to critique them. Good stuff though...
One of my movies I wanted to watch "We Were Soldiers" I haven't gotten around to yet (namely because I don't own it and was waiting to borrow it). So instead, I decided to reread the book "We Were Soldiers Once...and Young" by Lt. Gen. Harold "Hal" Moore and Joseph Galloway. Excellent read and top notch combat narrative if I say so myself.
It is my opinion that the United States lost the conflict in Vietnam on November 17, 1965 and here's why I say that. Examining Silver Bayonet (the operation into the Ia Drang Valley) in mid November 1965 will shed some light on this assessment.
Most people (who haven't read the book) don't realize there were actually two separate engagements as part of Silver Bayonet: battles for LZ X-Ray and Albany. One was an NVA slaughter while one was an American massacre. We Americans only hear about the US victory. But why were we so resoundly defeated at LZ Albany? Because we won at LZ X-Ray. How did we win at X-Ray? Two main reasons. Training and firepower.
Lt. Col. Hal Moore's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was THE army test battalion for the airmobility concept. Moore, Sgt. Maj. Basil Plumbley and Maj. Bruce Crandol (pilot) perfected how to work together as a team. This consisted of the grunts on the ground to the pilots in the air to the Air Force forward air controller (FAC) Capt. Charlie Hastings providing air support to Captains Donald Davis and Bob Barker's artillery support, the operation was ironed out long before ever setting foot on X-Ray. Between the wall of steel from LZ Falcon's arty, USN and USAF close support aircraft, it was difficult for NVA troops to break through US lines. Yes indeed there were moments when the issue was in doubt, but Moore's training and reliance on his commanders and his gentle balancing allowed crises to pass. Because of this, the Vietnamese commander Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu An realized that if he could get his forces close enough, the US couldn't use their artillery and air support, the Vietnamese could use their overwhelming numbers to butcher American troops. Huu An even ordered his men to "grab the Americans by the belt" to show how close to get.
It worked the next day at LZ Albany. With Moore's men airlifted out after Huu An pulled back, 1st Cavalry Division sent in two battalions, one was 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. Bob McDade. McDade was a former staff officer, who commanded a mismashed battalion of troops with little airmobility training. Essentially, they were the opposite of Moore's battalion in terms of training. As they marched to a new LZ, Albany, they were ambushed in column and split apart. On top of that, McDade hesitated to call down artillery and air support for fear (rightly so) of hitting his own men. US arty and bombs did almost as much damage as the NVA.
The airmobilty concept was sound, but it could be defeated. It required a HUGE support system that when it worked (X-Ray) could protect a heavily outnumbered US force from being overrun. When that support system failed (Albany), it showed just how devastating that could be.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Wednesday, March 9, 2011
US Military History in Popular Culture
So another idea from my friend Dave is to tackle the fun topic of accuracy of American Military themed movies. At first, I was taken aback. Lately, movies have become much more attentive to accuracy, but some...well, we're not gonna go there. May have to revisit some really baaaaaad history movies (Pearl Harbor...::vomits slightly in my mouth::), but we'll see. So far, I've got a few in mind, going to be watching "Tora, Tora, Tora" again as well as "Midway," "Gods and Generals," and others if I can. I look forward to watching some great and not so great films once again and critiquing them on their accuracy.
If you have any ideas for films, please feel free to comment.
Here's what I've got so far:
Midway
Tora, Tora, Tora
Gettysburg
Gods and Generals
John Adams (not fully a military film, but Adams does become a pirate!)
Band of Brothers
The Pacific
We Were Soldiers
The Patriot
Saving Private Ryan
Windtalkers
Jarhead
The Longest Day
Battle of the Bulge
A Bridge to Far
Black Hawk Down
The New World
The Great Escape
Great Raid
Flyboys
Glory
Thin Red Line
The Alamo (Not really American, but still a neat movie)
Sergeant York
The Green Berets
In Harm's Way
Sands of Iwo Jima
The Horse Soldiers
The Dirty Dozen
Pearl Harbor
I'm sure there are more, but this is a pretty comprehensive list.
If you have any ideas for films, please feel free to comment.
Here's what I've got so far:
Midway
Tora, Tora, Tora
Gettysburg
Gods and Generals
John Adams (not fully a military film, but Adams does become a pirate!)
Band of Brothers
The Pacific
We Were Soldiers
The Patriot
Saving Private Ryan
Windtalkers
Jarhead
The Longest Day
Battle of the Bulge
A Bridge to Far
Black Hawk Down
The New World
The Great Escape
Great Raid
Flyboys
Glory
Thin Red Line
The Alamo (Not really American, but still a neat movie)
Sergeant York
The Green Berets
In Harm's Way
Sands of Iwo Jima
The Horse Soldiers
The Dirty Dozen
Pearl Harbor
I'm sure there are more, but this is a pretty comprehensive list.
Friday, March 4, 2011
Washington: The Great Military Genius?
I will admit, I've been on a World War II tear personally (I recently watched "The Pacific" and am reading accounts of two of the Marines profiled in that series about their experiences in that firestorm), but I didn't want this to be a purely WWII blog. So I'm shifting gears and asking for input on America's first true military hero: George Washington.
What made Washington so great? Let's explore his experiences in war. As a young twentysomething, he started the French and Indian War and accompanied Braddock on his infamous march of destiny into the Pennsylvania wilderness. Unlike many of the contemporary British officers, he tasted defeat often early in his career and I believe this helped to forge the officer he would become. To often, success surprisingly leads to an inability to be a great officer. So to learn via failure is a great indicator of future success. He also learned how failure can be a good thing. If you look at Washington's record on the battlefield, he has really only two complete successes on the open battlefield: Trenton and Princeton. Monmouth can be considered a tactical and strategic victory, but he sustained higher losses than the British so that's a push in my mind. Yorktown, while an important victory, was a siege, not an open field fight. Look how many times Washington lost: Brooklyn Heights, Kip's Bay, Brandywine Creek, Germantown. He really doesn't have a good battlefield record, but realized something later generals (I'm singling out Napoleon and Lee here...trust me, I'm doing a post on Lee later about this) should have realized. From a strategic perspective instead of fighting to win, Washington often fought not to lose. How is that different? Washington realized he would never be able to win America's independence outright...he didn't have the troops or resources. But he could outlast the British government in England to the point where he could make the war to costly in blood and treasury for them to continue. Ultimately, this would happen. Yorktown led not to the end of the war because of the surrender of a British field army, rather, it ended due to the collapse of the wartime government (Americans call it an administration) at that time. The new government simply sued for peace to end the fighting.
Another thing I think Washington learned was to care for his troops. This is seen several times throughout the conflict. First is the cleaning up of the camps in 1775. He separated ill soldiers, tried to get them better rations and equipment. While this was not always possible, his troops recognized this. He appealed to them to continue the war after their victory at Trenton when many of them were due to go home at the end of the week. Many people point to Saratoga as the turning point of the revolution. If you ask me, there wouldn't be a Saratoga without a Trenton and a week later, Princeton. These twin victories sustained the Revolution through its darkest hour. Upon being forced out of Philadelphia and his failure to recapture the city, Washington set up the army at Valley Forge. Furloughs were given to officers to go home for part of the winter and many did to escape the difficult conditions. It would have been very easy for Washington to go home to Mount Vernon, where he had not seen in over three years. But he stayed with his men, fought with Congress for clothing, pay, and food. He improved sanitation and medical conditions as best he could.
Washington also recognized good subordinates, a must for any commander. Granted, he made a huge collapse of faith in Benedict Arnold, but otherwise he chose solid second tier commanders such as Greene, Harry Lee, Wayne and Knox. He also knew how to us the personnel sent to him by Congress. Most were former European officers who exaggerated their own opinion of themselves, but a few stood out above the rest. Officers like Steuben (Inspector General), Kościuszko (engineer), and in highest regard, the Marquis de La Fayette. These officers served Washington with distinction.
Another area that I believe made Washington a good general was his pre-war experience in charge of Mount Vernon. He had to run the plantation efficiently and effectively in order for it to succeed financially. It helped with logistics and planning when it comes to operating an army. Supply sometimes is harder to achieve than the actual combat tactics, so directing Mount Vernon's veritable army of slaves certainly helped make Washington a better army commander.
All these things came together in Washington to help him succeed where I believe other top ranked commanders in the Continental Army would not have.
What made Washington so great? Let's explore his experiences in war. As a young twentysomething, he started the French and Indian War and accompanied Braddock on his infamous march of destiny into the Pennsylvania wilderness. Unlike many of the contemporary British officers, he tasted defeat often early in his career and I believe this helped to forge the officer he would become. To often, success surprisingly leads to an inability to be a great officer. So to learn via failure is a great indicator of future success. He also learned how failure can be a good thing. If you look at Washington's record on the battlefield, he has really only two complete successes on the open battlefield: Trenton and Princeton. Monmouth can be considered a tactical and strategic victory, but he sustained higher losses than the British so that's a push in my mind. Yorktown, while an important victory, was a siege, not an open field fight. Look how many times Washington lost: Brooklyn Heights, Kip's Bay, Brandywine Creek, Germantown. He really doesn't have a good battlefield record, but realized something later generals (I'm singling out Napoleon and Lee here...trust me, I'm doing a post on Lee later about this) should have realized. From a strategic perspective instead of fighting to win, Washington often fought not to lose. How is that different? Washington realized he would never be able to win America's independence outright...he didn't have the troops or resources. But he could outlast the British government in England to the point where he could make the war to costly in blood and treasury for them to continue. Ultimately, this would happen. Yorktown led not to the end of the war because of the surrender of a British field army, rather, it ended due to the collapse of the wartime government (Americans call it an administration) at that time. The new government simply sued for peace to end the fighting.
Another thing I think Washington learned was to care for his troops. This is seen several times throughout the conflict. First is the cleaning up of the camps in 1775. He separated ill soldiers, tried to get them better rations and equipment. While this was not always possible, his troops recognized this. He appealed to them to continue the war after their victory at Trenton when many of them were due to go home at the end of the week. Many people point to Saratoga as the turning point of the revolution. If you ask me, there wouldn't be a Saratoga without a Trenton and a week later, Princeton. These twin victories sustained the Revolution through its darkest hour. Upon being forced out of Philadelphia and his failure to recapture the city, Washington set up the army at Valley Forge. Furloughs were given to officers to go home for part of the winter and many did to escape the difficult conditions. It would have been very easy for Washington to go home to Mount Vernon, where he had not seen in over three years. But he stayed with his men, fought with Congress for clothing, pay, and food. He improved sanitation and medical conditions as best he could.
Washington also recognized good subordinates, a must for any commander. Granted, he made a huge collapse of faith in Benedict Arnold, but otherwise he chose solid second tier commanders such as Greene, Harry Lee, Wayne and Knox. He also knew how to us the personnel sent to him by Congress. Most were former European officers who exaggerated their own opinion of themselves, but a few stood out above the rest. Officers like Steuben (Inspector General), Kościuszko (engineer), and in highest regard, the Marquis de La Fayette. These officers served Washington with distinction.
Another area that I believe made Washington a good general was his pre-war experience in charge of Mount Vernon. He had to run the plantation efficiently and effectively in order for it to succeed financially. It helped with logistics and planning when it comes to operating an army. Supply sometimes is harder to achieve than the actual combat tactics, so directing Mount Vernon's veritable army of slaves certainly helped make Washington a better army commander.
All these things came together in Washington to help him succeed where I believe other top ranked commanders in the Continental Army would not have.
Doing Britain's Dirty Work
I've been on a bit of a WWII tear, so please bear with me, I really plan for this to be an American Military History blog, but been inspired by a good friend of mine...thanks Dave.
A while back, I recently looked into the European Theater of Operations and made a startling realization about the British Army: they let the "colonials" do all the dirty work. Let's look shall we?
Canada - Their troops got some pretty raw deals. First, Dieppe. I mean, the British select the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division for this raid on a port city. They take serious losses...granted the Allied did learn a lot that would save Allied lives at Normandy two years later, but still, I think the Canucks got the short end of the stick. Next, the 1st Canadian Army was assigned the far left flank of the Allied advance, although they were not on the left flank of the landing at Normandy (Juno, the middle British sector beach versus Sword, the leftmost beach). It was their job to clear the Channel ports of German resistance (Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk). For their big finale, the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary was left to the Canadians in fighting on Walchren Island.
New Zealand - The 2nd New Zealand Division was assigned to Europe and fought in Greece and Crete. After being evacuated to Egypt, the division participated in the fight with Italy and Germany in the desert. They played a major supporting role in El Alamein and ultimately worked to expel the Axis from the North African shore. They were refitted during Sicily, but were sent to Italy and was involved in one of the most vicious assaults of the war at Monte Cassino. They finally went on to help penetrate the Gothic Line in Italy.
Australia - They took some serious beatings in World War II. They served in Greece, Crete and Egypt along with surrendering to the Japanese at Singapore. One of the most difficult fights for the Aussies was the defense of Tobruk, the port in Libya in North Africa. The Aussies were surrounded for nearly a year before being relieved, constantly harassed by air and on land, only getting supplied by the sea. In 1941 it was the Australians who broke Rommel's back at El Alamein through ferocious fighting.
India - These troops made up the bulk of the 14th Army found in Burma. They fought in the jungle and kept the Japanese out of India especially at the vicious jungle fights at Imphal and Kohima. Their forces also helped liberate Burma through the unbearable jungles.
Sure makes me wonder what was Britain's motivation...expendable colonials? Necessary Allies? We may never know. Just something to think about...
A while back, I recently looked into the European Theater of Operations and made a startling realization about the British Army: they let the "colonials" do all the dirty work. Let's look shall we?
Canada - Their troops got some pretty raw deals. First, Dieppe. I mean, the British select the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division for this raid on a port city. They take serious losses...granted the Allied did learn a lot that would save Allied lives at Normandy two years later, but still, I think the Canucks got the short end of the stick. Next, the 1st Canadian Army was assigned the far left flank of the Allied advance, although they were not on the left flank of the landing at Normandy (Juno, the middle British sector beach versus Sword, the leftmost beach). It was their job to clear the Channel ports of German resistance (Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk). For their big finale, the clearing of the Scheldt Estuary was left to the Canadians in fighting on Walchren Island.
New Zealand - The 2nd New Zealand Division was assigned to Europe and fought in Greece and Crete. After being evacuated to Egypt, the division participated in the fight with Italy and Germany in the desert. They played a major supporting role in El Alamein and ultimately worked to expel the Axis from the North African shore. They were refitted during Sicily, but were sent to Italy and was involved in one of the most vicious assaults of the war at Monte Cassino. They finally went on to help penetrate the Gothic Line in Italy.
Australia - They took some serious beatings in World War II. They served in Greece, Crete and Egypt along with surrendering to the Japanese at Singapore. One of the most difficult fights for the Aussies was the defense of Tobruk, the port in Libya in North Africa. The Aussies were surrounded for nearly a year before being relieved, constantly harassed by air and on land, only getting supplied by the sea. In 1941 it was the Australians who broke Rommel's back at El Alamein through ferocious fighting.
India - These troops made up the bulk of the 14th Army found in Burma. They fought in the jungle and kept the Japanese out of India especially at the vicious jungle fights at Imphal and Kohima. Their forces also helped liberate Burma through the unbearable jungles.
Sure makes me wonder what was Britain's motivation...expendable colonials? Necessary Allies? We may never know. Just something to think about...
Tuesday, March 1, 2011
R.I.P. Frank Buckles
I won't deny that World War I is not my specialty, I cannot deny the significance of this event. Frank Buckles, the last American veteran of World War I, died Sunday. It is truly an end of an era. I believe the last major passing of US veterans occurred in the 1950s with the deaths of the veterans of the Civil War. This also got me thinking about our last "doughboy."
World War I is another one of those "overlooked" wars here in America. It did not occur on any US territory and also not one memorialized in D.C. To most Americans, names like Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood don't evoke emotions like Pearl Harbor or Valley Forge. That is not to discount the veterans of that terrible conflict do not deserve our recognition and thanks. They endured much in the trenches, gas and for the first time, air attacks.
World War I was a nasty affair. Imagine the linear type tactics of the 19th century meeting the newest technology of the 20th: airplane, gas shell and most lethally, the machine gun. It also saw a new nickname for the US Marines: "Teufelhund"...literally translated "Devil Dogs." World War I invokes words such as "trenchfoot" and "mustard gas." It also led to the collapse of three monarchies in Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia).
What made it even more tragic was when the World War I veterans retired, America didn't want to listen to them. That was in the 1960s during Vietnam. Now, they are indeed a memory of a forgotten, misunderstood war now lost to the annals of American Military History.
World War I is another one of those "overlooked" wars here in America. It did not occur on any US territory and also not one memorialized in D.C. To most Americans, names like Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood don't evoke emotions like Pearl Harbor or Valley Forge. That is not to discount the veterans of that terrible conflict do not deserve our recognition and thanks. They endured much in the trenches, gas and for the first time, air attacks.
World War I was a nasty affair. Imagine the linear type tactics of the 19th century meeting the newest technology of the 20th: airplane, gas shell and most lethally, the machine gun. It also saw a new nickname for the US Marines: "Teufelhund"...literally translated "Devil Dogs." World War I invokes words such as "trenchfoot" and "mustard gas." It also led to the collapse of three monarchies in Europe (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia).
What made it even more tragic was when the World War I veterans retired, America didn't want to listen to them. That was in the 1960s during Vietnam. Now, they are indeed a memory of a forgotten, misunderstood war now lost to the annals of American Military History.
Sunday, February 27, 2011
Turning Point WWII: The Pacific
I would like to highly recommend the book "Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway" by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully. This book combined with Eric Hammel's book "Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea" to me has redefined the importance of Midway and the turning point in the Pacific Theater of Operations (PTO). While Midway is a decisive American victory, its importance must be reevaluated.
Parshall and Tully have completely busted the myth about the mythical "five minutes" at Midway because the main Japanese basis for that position was from Mitsuo Fuchida. He was a high ranking air officer on the carrier Akagi, but he wrote his book in the 1950s, well after the actual events. Fuchida also blamed the fates of war on the defeat, saying that the strike force was in fact on the deck ready to rumble down the decks when the Dauntlesses sneaked over top the carriers and demolished three carriers of the Kido Butai. In fact, "Shattered" places the strike force awaiting a transit to the flight deck to take off. The devil is in the details and there is where we find what truly happened. Arming a plane on a carrier was only half the story; spotting the plane for takeoff must be done on the deck on a Japanese carrier (unlike the well ventilated American hangers where we actually could). What is spotting? Essentially, it is warming up the plane and making sure that the plane will take what the crew will throw at it in flight. Same concept for a commercial driver inspecting their vehicles. The main reason the Japanese couldn't spot their aircraft was due to the US air attacks (like from Midway and the Devastator torpedo squadrons). The four aircraft carriers were to busy maintaining their combat air patrol to even think about spotting aircraft that and their poor aircraft directing.
Not to say that the loss of four aircraft carriers wasn't devastating. But lets look into the battle more concerning the first six months of the Pacific war. The Kido Butai was the First Mobile Fleet consisting of six fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. This force devastated Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, the Indian Ocean and Darwin, Australia. The Japanese should have realized that either all their carriers should have been involved or none of them because it gave them a major tactical advantage. However, they violated this principle by detaching Shokaku and Zuikaku for the Coral Sea operation. Of course, the Japanese could not have known that their communication code was broken, but the US knew their objective and that led to the Battle of Coral Sea. While the US lost carrier Lexington, the Shokaku was damaged heavily and Zuikaku's air group took heavy losses. Thus, both were out for the Midway operation. These two carriers were the present advantage in carriers the Japanese held over the US Navy. Japanese martial spirit thought their four senior carriers would be able to sweep the Americans from the seas. This was not to be.
While the Japanese lost their carriers, pilots and plane crews, the US launched an offensive onto Guadalcanal, an island in the Solomon Islands where the Japanese were building a new airfield to strike US supply routes to Australia. US Marines landed in August, but from August to November the USN and Japanese fought numerous battles, carrier and night surface battles. While the US Navy fought, it did lose precious carriers to the end of 1942. Compare losses of carriers in carrier battles in 1942:
US Japan
Coral Sea 1 sunk, 1 damaged 1 damaged
Midway 1 sunk 4 sunk
Eastern Solomon 1 damaged
Submarine attacks 1 sunk, 1 damaged
Santa Cruz 1 sunk, 1 damaged 1 damaged
So during 1942, the USN and IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) lost the same amount of carriers. America lost Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp, while Japan lost her four at Midway. At the end of the year, Japan had two operational fleet carriers to the USN's one (lucky Enterprise), but Japan's two carriers sustained such heavy losses in aircrew that they were rendered impotent for offensive action.
Due to a lack of carriers, the naval fighting around Guadalcanal devolved into a surface action. Four major surface actions occurred in Iron Bottom Sound, north of the island. Savo Island was the worst defeat on the high seas it ever suffered. Cape Esperance avenged that defeat, but to me it was the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal that seems to be the turning point of the PTO. Why do I say that? Let's investigate...
Japan's objective was to take the airfield they constructed on Guadalcanal, which the US renamed Henderson Field. If they could knock out the airfield, they could safely move in enough troops to eradicate resistance from the US Marines. By October and November, it became almost nightly for the Japanese Navy to streak down, bombard the airfield, then bug out before the US aircraft came streaking down on them. November 13th was the largest force the Japanese dispatched to bombard Henderson Field. The US Navy realized they had to stop them. The Japanese were not prepared for a surface action and the US was using an archaic surface formation. The result was the famous "bar room brawl" where the US lost two cruisers and four destroyers sunk with two cruisers and three destroyers heavily damaged. Crucially, Japan lost one battleship and two destroyers. In her history, Japan never lost a battleship before. While the carrier was emerging as the capital ship of navies, to lose a battleship was indeed a blow to prestige. This was reinforced by the November 15th fight (Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal) where Japan lost another battleship and destroyer while the US lost three destroyers sunk. The defeat of the Imperial Japanese Army on land was bad enough; for the Imperial Japanese Navy to lose two battleships at sea was pretty much point where Japan cried "uncle." Within a few weeks, Japan decided to throw in the towel and evacuate Guadalcanal.
That's not to say that Guadalcanal occurred in a vacuum. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal could not have occurred without gaining carrier parity at Midway and that could not have occurred without the removal of the two Japanese carriers as a result of the Coral Sea action. So the critical period of May to November 1942 set the tone for the rest of the Pacific action.
Parshall and Tully have completely busted the myth about the mythical "five minutes" at Midway because the main Japanese basis for that position was from Mitsuo Fuchida. He was a high ranking air officer on the carrier Akagi, but he wrote his book in the 1950s, well after the actual events. Fuchida also blamed the fates of war on the defeat, saying that the strike force was in fact on the deck ready to rumble down the decks when the Dauntlesses sneaked over top the carriers and demolished three carriers of the Kido Butai. In fact, "Shattered" places the strike force awaiting a transit to the flight deck to take off. The devil is in the details and there is where we find what truly happened. Arming a plane on a carrier was only half the story; spotting the plane for takeoff must be done on the deck on a Japanese carrier (unlike the well ventilated American hangers where we actually could). What is spotting? Essentially, it is warming up the plane and making sure that the plane will take what the crew will throw at it in flight. Same concept for a commercial driver inspecting their vehicles. The main reason the Japanese couldn't spot their aircraft was due to the US air attacks (like from Midway and the Devastator torpedo squadrons). The four aircraft carriers were to busy maintaining their combat air patrol to even think about spotting aircraft that and their poor aircraft directing.
Not to say that the loss of four aircraft carriers wasn't devastating. But lets look into the battle more concerning the first six months of the Pacific war. The Kido Butai was the First Mobile Fleet consisting of six fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku. This force devastated Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, the Indian Ocean and Darwin, Australia. The Japanese should have realized that either all their carriers should have been involved or none of them because it gave them a major tactical advantage. However, they violated this principle by detaching Shokaku and Zuikaku for the Coral Sea operation. Of course, the Japanese could not have known that their communication code was broken, but the US knew their objective and that led to the Battle of Coral Sea. While the US lost carrier Lexington, the Shokaku was damaged heavily and Zuikaku's air group took heavy losses. Thus, both were out for the Midway operation. These two carriers were the present advantage in carriers the Japanese held over the US Navy. Japanese martial spirit thought their four senior carriers would be able to sweep the Americans from the seas. This was not to be.
While the Japanese lost their carriers, pilots and plane crews, the US launched an offensive onto Guadalcanal, an island in the Solomon Islands where the Japanese were building a new airfield to strike US supply routes to Australia. US Marines landed in August, but from August to November the USN and Japanese fought numerous battles, carrier and night surface battles. While the US Navy fought, it did lose precious carriers to the end of 1942. Compare losses of carriers in carrier battles in 1942:
US Japan
Coral Sea 1 sunk, 1 damaged 1 damaged
Midway 1 sunk 4 sunk
Eastern Solomon 1 damaged
Submarine attacks 1 sunk, 1 damaged
Santa Cruz 1 sunk, 1 damaged 1 damaged
So during 1942, the USN and IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) lost the same amount of carriers. America lost Lexington, Yorktown, Hornet, and Wasp, while Japan lost her four at Midway. At the end of the year, Japan had two operational fleet carriers to the USN's one (lucky Enterprise), but Japan's two carriers sustained such heavy losses in aircrew that they were rendered impotent for offensive action.
Due to a lack of carriers, the naval fighting around Guadalcanal devolved into a surface action. Four major surface actions occurred in Iron Bottom Sound, north of the island. Savo Island was the worst defeat on the high seas it ever suffered. Cape Esperance avenged that defeat, but to me it was the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal that seems to be the turning point of the PTO. Why do I say that? Let's investigate...
Japan's objective was to take the airfield they constructed on Guadalcanal, which the US renamed Henderson Field. If they could knock out the airfield, they could safely move in enough troops to eradicate resistance from the US Marines. By October and November, it became almost nightly for the Japanese Navy to streak down, bombard the airfield, then bug out before the US aircraft came streaking down on them. November 13th was the largest force the Japanese dispatched to bombard Henderson Field. The US Navy realized they had to stop them. The Japanese were not prepared for a surface action and the US was using an archaic surface formation. The result was the famous "bar room brawl" where the US lost two cruisers and four destroyers sunk with two cruisers and three destroyers heavily damaged. Crucially, Japan lost one battleship and two destroyers. In her history, Japan never lost a battleship before. While the carrier was emerging as the capital ship of navies, to lose a battleship was indeed a blow to prestige. This was reinforced by the November 15th fight (Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal) where Japan lost another battleship and destroyer while the US lost three destroyers sunk. The defeat of the Imperial Japanese Army on land was bad enough; for the Imperial Japanese Navy to lose two battleships at sea was pretty much point where Japan cried "uncle." Within a few weeks, Japan decided to throw in the towel and evacuate Guadalcanal.
That's not to say that Guadalcanal occurred in a vacuum. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal could not have occurred without gaining carrier parity at Midway and that could not have occurred without the removal of the two Japanese carriers as a result of the Coral Sea action. So the critical period of May to November 1942 set the tone for the rest of the Pacific action.
Greetings!
Good day and welcome to my blog about United States Military History. My name is Matthew and I am a "professional" historian (as close to one can get in this economy). I have a Bachelors in History and it has been my passion since around age 7 when I got into the American Civil War at a gifted elementary school. Being that I am currently out of the history field (again, due to economic conditions) and needing a creative outlet, I started this blog just to jot down my thoughts and get feedback on American Military History.
My specialties include the Civil War and World War II. I am versed in the Revolutionary War, Mexican American War, Spanish American War, Korean War and the First Persian Gulf War. I honestly don't know as much as I should about World War I and Vietnam, but I'm always looking for more expertise.
My aims are to present American Military History in an unbiased fashion through a variety of means. This includes book reviews, wargaming and places to visit where I've been. I am based out of Virginia so this will include a lot of Virginia sites, but hey, we are history here in the Old Dominion. So sit back, enjoy the reading and jump in if you feel like it.
P.S. - I don't have internet at home, so please bear with me if I don't post every day.
My specialties include the Civil War and World War II. I am versed in the Revolutionary War, Mexican American War, Spanish American War, Korean War and the First Persian Gulf War. I honestly don't know as much as I should about World War I and Vietnam, but I'm always looking for more expertise.
My aims are to present American Military History in an unbiased fashion through a variety of means. This includes book reviews, wargaming and places to visit where I've been. I am based out of Virginia so this will include a lot of Virginia sites, but hey, we are history here in the Old Dominion. So sit back, enjoy the reading and jump in if you feel like it.
P.S. - I don't have internet at home, so please bear with me if I don't post every day.
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