I'd like to apologize for the lack of posts lately. I didn't think it was that long, but I will also confess I've had a bit of History burnout lately. I've also been binging on history movies in watching some good history movies to critique them. Good stuff though...
One of my movies I wanted to watch "We Were Soldiers" I haven't gotten around to yet (namely because I don't own it and was waiting to borrow it). So instead, I decided to reread the book "We Were Soldiers Once...and Young" by Lt. Gen. Harold "Hal" Moore and Joseph Galloway. Excellent read and top notch combat narrative if I say so myself.
It is my opinion that the United States lost the conflict in Vietnam on November 17, 1965 and here's why I say that. Examining Silver Bayonet (the operation into the Ia Drang Valley) in mid November 1965 will shed some light on this assessment.
Most people (who haven't read the book) don't realize there were actually two separate engagements as part of Silver Bayonet: battles for LZ X-Ray and Albany. One was an NVA slaughter while one was an American massacre. We Americans only hear about the US victory. But why were we so resoundly defeated at LZ Albany? Because we won at LZ X-Ray. How did we win at X-Ray? Two main reasons. Training and firepower.
Lt. Col. Hal Moore's 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was THE army test battalion for the airmobility concept. Moore, Sgt. Maj. Basil Plumbley and Maj. Bruce Crandol (pilot) perfected how to work together as a team. This consisted of the grunts on the ground to the pilots in the air to the Air Force forward air controller (FAC) Capt. Charlie Hastings providing air support to Captains Donald Davis and Bob Barker's artillery support, the operation was ironed out long before ever setting foot on X-Ray. Between the wall of steel from LZ Falcon's arty, USN and USAF close support aircraft, it was difficult for NVA troops to break through US lines. Yes indeed there were moments when the issue was in doubt, but Moore's training and reliance on his commanders and his gentle balancing allowed crises to pass. Because of this, the Vietnamese commander Lt. Col. Nguyen Huu An realized that if he could get his forces close enough, the US couldn't use their artillery and air support, the Vietnamese could use their overwhelming numbers to butcher American troops. Huu An even ordered his men to "grab the Americans by the belt" to show how close to get.
It worked the next day at LZ Albany. With Moore's men airlifted out after Huu An pulled back, 1st Cavalry Division sent in two battalions, one was 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. Bob McDade. McDade was a former staff officer, who commanded a mismashed battalion of troops with little airmobility training. Essentially, they were the opposite of Moore's battalion in terms of training. As they marched to a new LZ, Albany, they were ambushed in column and split apart. On top of that, McDade hesitated to call down artillery and air support for fear (rightly so) of hitting his own men. US arty and bombs did almost as much damage as the NVA.
The airmobilty concept was sound, but it could be defeated. It required a HUGE support system that when it worked (X-Ray) could protect a heavily outnumbered US force from being overrun. When that support system failed (Albany), it showed just how devastating that could be.
