So my wife and I went to Gettysburg over the summer and had a great time. Got a great hat...yeah my Mosby hat (actually an Appomattox hat, I got it wrong, BUT I'm calling it my Mosby hat); shoutout to a great retailer Dirty Billy's Hats. That is an AWESOME hat, great store, and great staff, but I digress...
I came home and found at VCU library (my wife is a grad student there and she checks out books for me) "The Gettysburg Companion" by Mark Adkin. Now at first glance, it is a solid work. But after reading through it, I did find a few inaccuracies, followed by a review on Amazon about Adkin not citing works and maps used. That aside, I will say that the maps are wonderful and he is very thorough. He also writes about critiques and concepts in the battle. While the book is not the most scholarly, it does pose some interesting questions and it made me ponder, could Lee truly have won at Gettysburg? My answer is surprisingly yes. (Keep in mind though that I do have the advantage of hindsight). There are several things he could have done differently.
First, "discretionary" orders. Lee should have been more specific in a situation like this. Instead of communicating to his commanders (ex. Stuart, Longstreet, Ewell) orders giving them latitude, he should have written out specific orders detailing what Lee wanted done. This also brings up councils of war. Often times before major campaigns, Lee would meet with his subordinates to describe the pieces of the puzzle and how troops would be working in concert. There is no evidence that Lee met with his four top subordinates (Longstreet, Ewell, Hill and Stuart) together at one time during the campaign, so that immediately put the Confederates at an extreme disadvantage. First, with Lee giving Stuart latitude, Stuart went on a ride where he disregarded Lee instructions to ultimately end up screening the right flank of the advance (namely covering the gaps in South Mountain to the east of Ewell's Second Corps). Instead, Stuart takes his three best brigades on a ride around the Army of the Potomac and ended up being cut off and the senior brigade commander (Beverly Robertson) was incompetent. But even then, Lee still should have kept track of the cavalry left behind and did not. As a commander, Lee failed to keep track of all his available units, despite Stuart's disappearance. Robertson's two brigades could have been used to good effect if Lee had stayed on top of their positions. They could have screened the army coming over Cashtown Pass.
Another failure of command was simply not bringing the army back together sooner. It wasn't until the afternoon of the 29th that Lee ordered the army back rendezvous in the Gettysburg/Cashtown area. While Lee was trying to threaten Harrisburg and Wrightsville across the Susquehanna, he should have reasoned the Federals were close behind his army after being tardy to the party. Even then, he could have used the area around Gettysburg to his advantage. I thought the ANV was still coming up from the south on July 1st and the First Corps under Longstreet was south of Chambersburg and was nowhere near being able to support Hill's advance into Gettysburg. Quite the contrary; Longstreet's ENTIRE First Corps were encamped around Chambersburg from June 27-30. That is three days! On July 1st, out of Lee's nine infantry divisions, only two were east of the South Mountain: Rodes and Early. The remaining seven were stacked up along the Chambersburg Pike and bottlenecked at Cashtown Pass. I don't know how many of you have actually travelled along the pass, but it is a narrow defile even today that is easily over ten miles! If Lee were smart, he would have scouted out nearby passes to see where he could have moved the army over in a hurry if needed. One of the closest passes only about 20 miles to the south was Monterey Gap (Pass). What made this option even more attractive was its link to Fairfield, PA and the Fairfield Road. If Lee had moved the entire First Corps south to cross over South Mountain at Monterey Gap, it would have been disastrous for Meade at Gettysburg. Imagine on July 1st, Heth is headed into Gettysburg with the remaining divisions of the Third Corps (Pender and Anderson) behind him. Moving down from the north a few miles away is Ewell's pair of divisions of Rodes and Early. But instead of being stacked up behind Cashtown Pass, moving up from the southwest is Hood and McLaws. What would have eventually confronted them was I Corps and XI Corps along with Buford's cavalry. Six Confederate divisions against only two Union corps? Yeah, definitely could have done some serious damage to Meade's army...at the least, could have evened the odds with Meade. Of course, more than likely Meade would have withdrawn to Pipe Creek, but still, the question remains, what could have happened if Lee took a little more after Napoleon in marching his troops on a broad front. Napoleon was known for "marching divided, fighting united." He would have his entire corps de armee along sometimes up to a 200 mile front in order to supply them and have them not hinder anyone else's movements. Often times what would happen was if the vanguard made contact with the enemy, it would hold the enemy in place. The supporting and reserve corps were often within only a half day's march of the point of contact and thus give Napoleon great tactical and strategic options.
If Lee tried this at Gettysburg, the most vulnerable corps would have been Longstreet's, being that his First Corps was closest to the Army of the Potomac, presumably south of the MD/PA state line. Worst case scenario, Longstreet would dig in along the Monterey Gap/Fairfield Pass and lock Meade's army into place, while marching down from the north would have been Hill's corps coming over the Cashtown Pass and supporting his left would have been Ewell's pair of divisions marching in from Heidlersburg. If Meade had advanced as far north as Gettysburg (which he was near that position on July 1st), Hill would have occupied the middle of Lee's position with Ewell advancing from the north, and Longstreet would be in position to catch any Union troops marching hard to reinforce Meade's corps at Gettysburg or threaten the Gettysburg position from a new axis of advance. If Meade did figure out what Lee was up to, Meade would have fallen back to Pipe Creek. Lee would pursued along a three pronged axis (Longstreet to the west from Fairfield to Emmitsburg to Taneytown, Hill in the middle from Cashtown to Gettysburg to Littlestown and Ewell to the east from Heidelsburg to Gettysburg to Hanover to Union Mills area). Meade would have been in a bad spot having sent I Corps with XI Corps in support to Gettysburg with III Corps at Emmitsburg. All three would have been isolated with Lee moving in from the east and north against I & XI Corps and northeast against III Corps. If even one of these formations had been mauled, it would have made Meade's plan to defend at Pipe Creek that much more difficult.
Granted Meade would have had some great advantages of his own. His QM and Supply Corps would have set up a base at Westminster, the end of the Western Maryland Railroad. Historically, it was the Army of the Potomac's base, but the Pipe Creek line would have ensured a closer resupply, versus Lee who had little supply coming over the mountains. From what I have heard, it was an extremely strong position, thus negating the loss of any troops lost (I, III or XI Corps). Additionally, he had just about his entire army in place, while Lee would have only had two thirds of his infantry divisions moving along his advance, but the remaining divisions would have been in close support. Meade would have dug in and it would have been a Fredericksburg in reverse.
I hope this has been an interesting speculation on Gettysburg.
