A Stonewall Jackson "What if"

I’m sorry for lack of posts recently, but when the Internet connection at home doesn’t work and now you have to transpose to the library’s computer, fun times indeed.  At an hour at a time, I don’t want to be constrained by time.

This blog has been on my mind since early May and I’ve been pondering it for a while.  Back in early May (the 10^th I believe), someone asked on Facebook the question whether Jackson’s death would have changed the Civil War.  The answer choices was yes; no, but it certainly didn’t help; and no.  Most of the answers were yes or no with the caveat.  At the time I posted, I was the only person who said no.  This got me thinking of all points of view on this.

There were a few other folks who posted on both, so I do have a place to start.  The yes folks went with the standard “Gettysburg” answer, and this does deserve a little respect and insight.  If Jackson were alive, it is indeed possible.  Lee would not have reorganized his army and with Jackson in command, things may or may not have been different at Gettysburg.  There is precedence that Jackson may have engaged the Federals on the first day of Gettysburg (assuming events continued as followed).  Heck, there may not have even been a battle at Gettysburg if Jackson were alive.  But assuming the events continued and it was Jackson in command the first day instead of Hill and Ewell, I do believe it would have made a difference.  Jackson would not have allowed his corps to be spread out (ex. 2^nd Manassas) and probably could have overwhelmed Buford’s and Reynolds’ troops.  He could have also taken Cemetery Hill, unlike Ewell, mainly due to his inspirational leadership and his understanding of Lee’s “suggestive” orders.  Even more believe that Jackson would have prevented Pickett’s Charge.  While this is a bit thin, again, this all depends on events occurring as we know them.  Jackson may have “advised” Lee to not invade the North, but simply threaten Washington as he did the previous summer after Manassas.    

Why I ended up saying No is very simple.  I think Lee wrecked his army in 1862 by his desperate campaign around Richmond in the Seven Days Battles.  The situation was only made worse by the remaining 1862 campaigns and 1863.  Looking at casualties, Lee’s army sustained 20,000+ casualties during the Seven Days, 10,000+ for the 2^nd Manassas Campaign, 12,000+ for Antietam Campaign, 5,000+ for Fredericksburg and 12,000+ for Chancellorsville.  Those are some massive casualty rates.  What makes it worse is the casualty rates among officers.  Lee could ill afford to many casualties and you have to examine how many of these battles were offensive in nature for the Confederates:

Seven Days Battles (necessity in order to save Richmond, but truly excessive casualties)

2nd Manassas Campaign (again, offensive in nature, but still could have been avoided by defensive fight)

Antietam (not offensive in tactical nature, but strategic offensive)

Chancellorsville (truly aggresive and losses showed it)

Lee had one mission during the Civil War and it was the same as his ancestor (by marriage) from the Revolution...not lose.  He didn't have to score the knockout blow, he didn't have to conquer the North, he just had to outlast the Northern populace (like the colonies did to England).  But what made this notion change during the 80 odd years?  One man...Napoleon Bonaparte.  Napoleon scored decisive victories time and time again, but it ended up costing him, such as Lee.  The Grande Armee of 1805 was not the same force by 1812 or even 1809 because of Napoleon's excessively aggressive tactics.  Napoleon conscripted "allies" in order to sustain his army for so long; Lee could not.  What Lee had in terms of population was it.  Additionally, and to me this is most important, Napoleon still lost.  It may have taken the Allied coalitions nearly twenty years, but ultimately they triumphed and forced Napoleon into exile.  Didn't Lee think about this as he studied Napoleon's command and battles?

If you want further proof, take a look at my attached link.  Great empirical study of Lee and Grant's command styles.